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In 1931, Kurt Lewin published a plea for the transition from what he identified as the Aristotelian
mode of thought in psychology to a Galilean mode (Lewin, 1931). According to Lewin, the
Aristotelian mode is characterized by a category-based, top-down approach to study psychological
processes. Psychological concepts/categories are taken from everyday-life observations and they
tend to be “valuative” and binary in nature (“normal” vs. “pathological;” “true perception” vs.
“illusion”). Explanations for novel phenomena are provided by assigning them to an existing
category. The scientific ambition to explain psychological mechanisms is restricted to phenomena
that can be observed with a high degree of consistency and replicability, which leads to a focus
on mean effects and the neglect of individual or situational variability. Lewin emphasizes that this
approach implies an anti-thesis between individuality of events or people on the one hand and
lawfulness on the other, with the former falling outside the task of science.
In contrast, the Galilean mode focuses on the mechanism underlying a given
observation/phenomenon, without restricting the theoretical or empirical treatment of this
mechanism to this particular observation/phenomenon. This mode also tends to resolve binary
distinctions and oppositions into gradual transitions, so that the explanation of both “normal”
and “pathological” behavior, and of both “true perception” and “illusion,” refers to the same
basic mechanisms (e.g., by assuming different degrees of contribution or different parameters
being used). This leads to a more bottom-up approach, in which various kinds of phenomena
are reconstructed and, thus, explained through the interaction of a number of basic mechanisms
and principles, irrespective of the category to which these phenomena are thought to belong. Of
interest, this approach reduces the theoretical tension between individuality and lawfulness, as the
same mechanisms can, and indeed should be used to explain both regularity and deviation.
Lewin identified some preliminary steps toward the Galilean approach in the psychological
sciences, but he argued that there is still a long way to go. Today, 75 years later, we see some progress
beyond the state of affairs described by Lewin, but we believe that major challenges remain to be
tackled. On the one hand, the interest in mechanistic explanations of psychological phenomena has
undoubtedly increased, and neural or mathematical models play an increasing role in the scientific
discussion. On the other hand, however, the Aristotelian heritage is still visible in various places.
Think of the ongoing popularity of the Sternberg approach to information processing (Sternberg,
1969), e.g., as applied by locus-of-slack analyses of dual-task performance (McCann and Johnston,
1992). The major aim of studies in this tradition is to identify the processing stage underlying an
experimental effect, such as dual-task costs that are commonly attributed to the response-selection
stage (Pashler, 1994). This amounts to a mere Aristotelian categorization of phenomena, without
much effort to unravel the actual mechanism—so that we still fail to understand exactly how a
response is selected and why this process is affected by another task.
Similar tendencies can be observed in the cognitive neurosciences, where the identification of
the “neural correlates” (i.e., the brain area/systemwhose activation correlates with the psychological
phenomenon of interest) is commonly taken to be sufficient to “explain” the phenomenon. Think of
Hommel and Colzato Aristotelian vs. Galilean Science
research on the theory of mind, a fascinating cognitive skill that
many authors feel to be sufficiently explained by the fact that
activity of the right TPJ systematically correlates with employing
it (e.g., Saxe et al., 2004). How these systems generate the skill
remains a mystery however.
One can think of many reasons why we should try harder to
move our science toward a more Galilean approach, and we have
discussed one of them elsewhere (Hommel and Colzato, 2015). A
particularly important reason relates to the relationship between
nomothetic and ideographic approaches (i.e., approaches that
seek to establish general laws vs. those that seek to account for
individual differences) however. As Lewin points out, the practice
of explaining phenomena by categorizing and sorting them into
types provides a strong motivation to ignore variability within
a given category. This does not only apply to the phenomena
assigned to a particular category (which for instance explains the
lack of interest in differences between tasks that seem to affect
the same processing stage, such as flanker, Stroop, and Simon
tasks) but it in particular applies to individual differences. In
the cognitive sciences and neurosciences, individual differences
are commonly taken to reflect random variability that needs
to be reduced as much as possible. Indeed, the widespread
use of statistical methods that either control and “average-out”
individual differences, such as repeated-measures ANOVAs, or
that consider individual differences as noise that works against
the actually interesting effect, such as univariate ANOVAs and
related procedures, demonstrates that both inter-individual and
intra-individual differences are not only irrelevant but may even
provide an obstacle for explaining the investigated phenomenon.
We suggest that progress in our discipline demands that
we overcome this practice which, following Lewin’s reasoning,
would push our scientific practice further toward a more mature,
truly Galilean mode. The major goal would thus no longer exist
in sorting phenomena into categories but rather identify core
mechanisms that can be used to reconstruct both each given
phenomenon and individual variability therein. The first step
toward understanding a phenomenon would no longer consist
in finding an optimal definition that seeks to eliminate the
conceptual overlap with other phenomena, so that we would no
longer need to argue whether and exactly how, say, emotion is
different from motivation and cognition, or how empathy differs
from contagion and imitation. Instead, this analytical approach
would be replaced by a more synthetic approach (in the sense
of Braitenberg, 1984; see Hommel and Colzato, 2015), which
consists in identifying the way core mechanisms (described
with a degree of specificity that goes beyond just indicating the
neural area housing them or mere verbal labeling, as in stage
approaches) interact to produce the to-be-explained behavior.
Such a practice is not too different from common theorizing
in behavioristic approaches, only that the toolbox of available
core mechanisms need not be restricted to stimulus-response
associations. Rather than identifying information-processing
stages that are further treated as black boxes, we would need to
move on and explain how combinations of core mechanisms are
able to generate the performance currently ascribed to each of
these stages. Most importantly, however, we would no longer try
to eliminate individual differences but build mechanistic theories
that explain both mean effects and individual variability. In other
words, we would try to understand the mechanics of intra-
and inter-individual variation and would directly connect these
mechanics to the core mechanism being held responsible for the
mean effect.
A serious attempt of integrating nomothetic and ideographic
approaches to human cognition would not only move our
discipline to a more mature scientific level, it would also be likely
tomake empirical studiesmore efficient (as bothmean effects and
individual variability can serve as data) and account for at least
some portions of what is commonly considered the replication
crisis in psychology. Let us take the relationship between mood
and creativity as an example. Numerous studies have suggested
that better mood improves creativity, but a recent meta-analysis
has also revealed numerous failures to replicate this relationship
(Baas et al., 2008). An Aristotelian approach would consider this
state of affairs very problematic and a strong reason to raise
doubts in the impact of mood on creativity. A Galilean approach
would suggest another research strategy however.
First, it would not follow the practice of first categorizing
all sorts of performance as “creative” and then seeking for
one coherent explanation. Rather, it would try to reconstruct
one given behavioral performance by referring to known basic
mechanisms, which in turn would quickly reveal that some
“creativity tasks” rely on converging mechanisms while others
rely on diverging mechanisms, that some of these tasks rely more
on the verbal vocabulary and verbal intelligence than others, and
so forth. From these insights into differences regarding the core
mechanisms a systematic categorization of tasks may emerge, but
the resulting category system would be a result of understanding
the underlying mechanisms rather than the vanishing point
of seeking for them. And it would be motivated by scientific
insight rather than by the questionable linguistic analyses of fuzzy
everyday concepts.
Second, a Galilean approach would have the ambition to
explain and predict intra- and inter-individual variability. How
this ambition can prevent the misinterpretation of failures to
replicate can be illustrated by means of two studies from our
lab. Based on previous speculations that creativity may be related
to dopamine, Chermahini and Hommel (2010) studied the
relationship between performance in two creativity tasks (one
tapping into convergent and the other into divergent thinking)
and the spontaneous eyeblink rate, a clinical indicator of the
individual dopamine level in the nigrostriatal pathway. Two
outcomes are important for our purposes: (A) Performance in
divergent-thinking task was predicted by eyeblink rates while
performance in the convergent-thinking task was not, which
reinforces the suspicion that there is no such a thing as
unitary “creativity;” (B) the relationship between performance
in the divergent-thinking task and the indicated dopamine level
followed an inverted U-shaped (as shown in Figure 1), so that
a medium level was associated with the best performance. Note
that the first outcome suggests that seeking for a relationship
between mood and “creativity” may be moot (as no task
is likely to capture creativity as a whole), while important
relationships between mood and some mechanisms underlying
creative performance may truly exist.
Also note that the demonstrated non-linear relationship may
easily account for quite a number of non-replications. As mood
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FIGURE 1 | Performance in divergent thinking as a function of the
spontaneous eyeblink rate (idealized).
is related to striatal dopamine levels, one would expect that
individuals having a low level (those falling into the A box in the
figure) are likely to benefit from a mood-induced increase of the
dopamine level, while individuals with a medium level may not
show any effect and individuals with a high level may in fact show
impairments. Indeed, Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2012)
reported that low blinkers benefit from positive-mood induction
while medium blinkers do not.
It is easy to see that the failure of taking into account
individual differences is likely to produce null-effects but that
such effects do not at all undermine the claim of a strong
connection between creativity and mood. In fact, a Galilean
approach to both the conceptualization of the problem and
the statistical analysis is likely to have revealed considerable
evidence even from studies that are currently considered as
failures to replicate. In another study, we have provided evidence
that cognitive transfer is mediated by dopamine-related genetic
differences, such that individuals with one genetic setup to benefit
from cognitive training while others do not (Colzato et al., 2014).
Among other things, this raises questions regarding the general
validity of claims that cognitive training does not show any
transfer effect (Owen et al., 2010), especially if they are based
on studies that are silent with regard to the underlying core
mechanisms and the role of individual variability (Colzato and
Hommel, 2016).
A concerted action to speed up a transition to a Galilean
mode does not only require considerable readjustments of our
theorizing and empirical practice, it also requires changes in
the mindsets of reviewers and readers. We should no longer
applaud theories that aim to provide an exhaustive explanation
of a particular task or empirical observation but rather learn to
value theoretical frameworks that track down core mechanisms
in as many phenomena as possible. We should also no longer
applaud the unconstrained invention of new concepts and
phenomena but rather learn to value parsimonious (in Occam’s
sense) explanations that can do with already understood basic
mechanisms as much as possible. Most importantly, we should
no longer be satisfied withmodels that are restricted to predicting
mean effects but increasingly require frameworks that explain
both mean effects and individual variation in terms of the same
mechanistic insight.
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